Archive for May, 2011

Cesar Caligula did not need Senate’s approval for his Libyan campaign and neither does President Obama
As Ron Paul says, “Last week, the 60-day deadline for the president to gain congressional approval for our military engagement in Libya under the War Powers Resolution came and went. The media scarcely noticed. The bombings continued. We had a hearing on Capitol Hill on the subject, but the administration refuses to bother with the legality of its new war. It is unclear if Mr. Obama will ever obtain congressional consent, and, astonishingly, it is being argued that he doesn’t need it. … Our presidents can now, on their own, order assassinations, including of American citizens; operate secret military tribunals; engage in torture; enforce indefinite imprisonment without due process; order searches and seizures without proper warrants, gutting the 4th Amendment; ignore the 60-day rule for reporting to the Congress the nature of any military operations as required by the War Powers Resolution; continue the PATRIOT Act abuses without oversight; wage war at will; and treat all Americans as suspected terrorists at airports with TSA groping and nude x-rays.”

No Boots on the Ground in Libya – Must be Wearing Sandals
“Troops Believed to Be British, Are Violating UN Ban. The United Nations resolution calling for a no-fly zone was a useful pretext for the Western air war against Libya, but it came with one very specific restriction: absolutely no ground troops were to be allowed in the country.”
Telegraph is saying that there are western soldiers (“advisors”) both in Benghazi and Misrata.
So the victory in Misrata was not rebels’.

Libyan Generals Are Defecting – or maybe not
“Five generals, two colonels and a major told a news conference in Rome that they fled Libya in protest at the killings of civilians.”
They found a great way how to move legally to Europe so they said what they needed to say. Or would saying that they are afraid of bombs earn them asylum?
“The generals who defected may have been forced out – according to one account, one motive was the rise of younger, more assertive Gaddafi loyalists, many from the leader’s own tribe, in the ranks.” Even Telegraph admits that it is just a propaganda.

Gadhafi’s Military only 20% of the previous strength
“Gen. Halasa also told the news conference that Col Gaddafi’s support was rapidly weakening and his military running at 20 per cent capacity.”
Only 20% and still holding most of Libya? Interesting.

Did the pro-Nato Rebels killed all POWs?
“The rebels are holding about 300 prisoners, including 10 foreigners, according to the top legal affairs official in the newly created National Transitional Council, Salwa Fawzi al-Deghali. … The low prisoner count raises questions about what has happened to the scores of alleged mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa that the rebels earlier reported capturing. The rebels have accused Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi of bringing in thousands of mercenaries, and their fate remains an open question.”
If they did kill them, then Nato countries, whose intelligence services and military advisors are active in rebel territory and therefore must know the truth, would be responsible. How much money is involved that we are involved on the side of these war criminals?
“Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague said he is investigating reports of unlawful arrest, mistreatment and killing of “sub-Saharan African civilians wrongly perceived to be mercenaries.”
He said angry mobs in rebel-controlled Benghazi and other cities are accused of assaulting and killing dozens of them, and perpetrators could be prosecuted for war crimes.”
Don’t hold your breath.

Telegraph writes that SAS did not dare to snatch him before he went into hiding, afraid of his bodyguards. It also says that the arrest was staged by Serbian government and a result of year-long negotiations that included British, French, and German secret services.

That would sound like Ratko needed a medical care and so he negotiated his surrender.

Then maybe all this conspirational talk is a bull which would better fit with claims by his family and lawyer that he is not fully aware of what’s going on.

Ratko Mladic is an accused war criminal. But consider this:

The real Srebrenica Genocide . (Warning: pictures on this linked page may be unsuitable for viewing by some people as they show tortured bodies and heads severed by jihadists.)

It also shows President Clinton attending the unveiling of an Arabic-inscribed monument dedicated to fallen al Qaeda Mujahedeen fighters in Srebrenica-Potocari, Bosnia.

Why is Clinton bowing to this monument?

3,870 Serbian elderly men, women and young children in and around the town of Srebrenica were massacred by Naser Oric’s Moslem forces before Ratko Mladic stopped it.

This article claims that Bill Clinton received $250,000 for his attendance and bow. That would make sense, financially.

Here is more reading on those events for those who want to learn beyond the sound bites served by mass media.

A summary of what is undisputed and what is disputed is here. And this blog writes about some westerners involved say about Srebrenica and Serbs. Generals Morillon and MacKenzie commanded UN peace keeping troops in Bosnia and Lord Owen was involved in political negotiations.

Finally, this article discusses that Alija Izetbegovic’s Moslem Bosnia was not a secular European vision but a vision for the return of times of the Ottoman Empire when moslems ruled over Christians in Europe.

General Ratko Mladic, the War Criminal
In the previous blog, we have outlined the accepted facts of the Srebrenica case and isolated controversial elements that are being argued by both sides. This blog talks about what the real jihad in Bosnia was.

Let’s Look at What Westerners Involved in Bosnia Said
According to French General Philippe Morillon, the UNPROFOR commander (also published here), the crimes committed by Muslim commander in Srebrenica, Naser Oric, were so extraordinary that the level of hatred they created were exceptional even by the measures of Bosnia civil war.

He testified at The Hague Tribunal on February 12, 2004, that Naser Oric “engaged in attacks during Orthodox (Christian) holidays and destroyed villages, massacring all the inhabitants.

This paints the real picture because Srebrenica had witnessed many massacres of Serbian Christians within the surrounding region and the Muslim Bosniak forces were clearly not innocent.

Indeed, it must be pointed out that Bosnian Serb forces allowed Muslim women and others, to flee Srebrenica. Yet clearly the Muslim Bosniak forces cared little about this and many Serbian women, old people, and Serbs in general, were massacred in surrounding villages.

Major-General (Ret) Lewis Mackenzie who is a retired Canadian general also raises serious doubts about so-called “good” and “evil.” In his article called “The real story behind Srebrenica. The massacre in the UN ‘safe haven’ was not a black and white event,” which was published in The Globe and Mail (July 14, 2005), he says:

“As the Bosnian Muslim fighters became better equipped and trained, they started to venture outside Srebrenica, burning Serb villages and killing their occupants before quickly withdrawing to the security provided by the UN’s safe haven. These attacks reached a crescendo in 1994 and carried on into early 1995 .”

General MacKenzie also disputed that Srebrenica ever was an UN Safe area and argued that the demilitarization requirements imposed on both the Serb side (surrounding Srebrenica) and the Bosniak side (inside the enclave) were never fulfilled.

General Morillon comments that “Naser Oric was a warlord who reigned by terror in his area and over the population itself. I think that he realized that these were the rules of this horrific war, that he could not allow himself to take prisoners. According to my recollection, he didn’t even look for an excuse. It was simply a statement: One can’t be bothered with prisoners.”

Morillon also recounts how “the Serbs took me to a village to show me the evacuation of the bodies of the inhabitants that had been thrown into a hole, a village close to Bratunac. And this made me understand the degree to which this infernal situation of blood and vengeance […] led to a situation when I personally feared that the worst would happen if the Serbs of Bosnia managed to enter the enclaves and Srebrenica.”

“I feared that the Serbs, the local Serbs, the Serbs of Bratunac, these militiamen, they wanted to take their revenge for everything that they attributed to Naser Oric.

Again, the comment by Morillon appears to be vindicated by Lord Owen because Lord Owen was clearly worried about the fall of Srebrenica. Lord Owen highlights on page 143 of his book, Balkan Odyssey, that “On 16 April I spoke on the telephone to President Milosevic about my anxiety that, despite repeated assurances from Dr. Karadzic that he had no intention of taking Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb army was now proceeding to do just that. The pocket was greatly reduced in size. I had rarely heard Milosevic so exasperated, but also so worried: he feared that if the Bosnian Serb troops entered Srebrenica there would be a bloodbath because of the tremendous bad blood that existed between the two armies. The Bosnian Serbs held the young Muslim commander in Srebrenica, Naser Oric, responsible for a massacre near Bratunac in December 1992 in which many Serb civilians had been killed. Milosevic believed it would be a great mistake for the Bosnian Serbs to take Srebrenica and promised to tell Karadzic so.”

I have given quotes from people who were on the ground and from people who know a lot about the real events of Bosnia and Srebrenica. It would be difficult to claim that Lord Owen, General Morillon, and Lewis MacKenzie, are pro-Serbian or that they are holocaust deniers.

Therefore, it is clear that “the real Srebrenica” is not being told and the same applies to the “hidden Islamic jihad” which took place during the civil war and how ex-President Bill Clinton gave the green light to Islamists from all over the world to enter Bosnia.

Yes, Srebrenica must be remembered and this applies to the thousands of innocent Christians and Muslims who were killed by both sides in and around Srebrenica. However, this Srebrenica must tell the world about the real facts and how this city had a major Bosniak Muslim army which had killed and slaughtered many innocent Christian Serbs.

Lewis MacKenzie comments that “two wrongs never made a right, but those moments in history that shame us all because of our indifference should not be viewed in isolation without the context that created them.”

With this comment in mind and with the complex nature of Srebrenica and the entire civil war; then Ratko Mladic should be seen for what Srebrenica had become and in all wars you have massacres and in Bosnia – just like in all civil wars – many innocents were killed on all sides but this does not mean that history should be re-written and that one side should be blamed for everything when the facts state differently.

Most war crimes and genocides (not all) are of this type.
Two sides develop such intense hatred, due to atrocities by both sides, that when one side wins it massacres the other. Most of the time, the exact same thing would have happened in reverse had the other side won.
Yet these events are usually presented as being due solely to the evil of the winning side, with the losers being purely innocent victims.

As has been reported by the world media, former Bosnian Serb general Mladic was arrested in Serbia.

Mladic was indicted in 1995 by the U.N. war crimes tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, on charges including genocide in connection with the slaughter 8,000 Muslims in Srebrenica — the worst massacre in Europe since the Nazi era.

The only problem is, is the accusation correct? Some of the “alternative” truths are here and here.

There are several undisputed facts about Bosnia civil war:
– There were thousands of mujahedeen, mostly from Arab countries that committed attrocities against Serbs (and also Croats), the word was “Christians”. As for the “command responsibility”, the Bosnian leadership was fully responsible for their crimes as they brought them in.
– The US that was claiming “enforcing” the embargo against all participants in the civil war – Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs let mujahedeen volunteers and weapons reach the conflict zone on Bosniak’s side.
– The several “safe heavens” including Srebrenica never met the requirements for their establishment, namely that there be no soldiers, no arms, and especially no attacks of surounding areas emanting from these “safe heavens”.
– Bosniak solders kept attacking neighboring Serbian villages where they were killing women and elderly, not soldiers. Doing this, they were committing war crimes. (Soldiers that commit war crimes are not protected by Geneva conventions and killing such soldiers is not a war crime.)
– Ratko Mladic’s begging for UN peacekeepers to stop that went unaswered. The Bosniaks refused to be disarmed and UN under US pressure did not push for it. Ratko Mladic’s warnings that if not UN then Serbs will stop this attrocities were ignored.
– Bosniak commander of Srebrenica, Naser Oric, tortured and killed Serb prisoners, soldiers and civilians alike. He openly told western visitors that he is doing it.
– Naser Oric escaped from Srebrenica a few days before the offensive and left his troops to fend for themselves.
– Bosniak soldiers were ordered not to surender but fight their way to Bosniak-held Tuzla and they did so. Many of those soldiers reached Tuzla and many were killed in firefights.
– Ratko Mladic organized busses to transport Bosniak women and children to Tuzla. (Genocide would have been to kill them on the spot.)
– There are mass graves. (But mass graves are in every war as there is no time after a battle to dig a separate grave for each person.)

What is controversial is:
– How many Bosniak soldiers reached Tuzla.
– How many Bosniak soldiers were killed while fighting to get there.
– How many Bosniak soldiers were killed after they surendered.
– How many of the killed Bosniak soldiers did not commit war crimes before and therefore should have been protected as POWs.
– Did Ratko Maldic give orders to kill Bosniak soldiers that surrendered?

My opinion:
– The innocent should not have been killed, by either side
– The POWs should have been protected
– The guilty from both sides should have been brought to justice

What actually happened:
– Americans’ intelligence was attacked by the US government and US media by describing the situation as black and white / angel and evil instead of describing the shades of gray. One side good, the other bad. It does help people form their opinion but not necessarily the correct opinion.
– The bad guys selected were Serbs.
– The US helped global jihadists to gain training and get a foothold in Europe
– The global standing of the US has sufferred. (But do we care?)

George Friedman

In my book “The Next Decade,” I spend a good deal of time considering the relation of the American Empire to the American Republic and the threat the empire poses to the republic. If there is a single point where these matters converge, it is in the constitutional requirement that Congress approve wars through a declaration of war and in the abandonment of this requirement since World War II. This is the point where the burdens and interests of the United States as a global empire collide with the principles and rights of the United States as a republic.

(Beta, file)World War II was the last war the United States fought with a formal declaration of war. The wars fought since have had congressional approval, both in the sense that resolutions were passed and that Congress appropriated funds, but the Constitution is explicit in requiring a formal declaration. It does so for two reasons, I think. The first is to prevent the president from taking the country to war without the consent of the governed, as represented by Congress. Second, by providing for a specific path to war, it provides the president power and legitimacy he would not have without that declaration; it both restrains the president and empowers him. Not only does it make his position as commander in chief unassailable by authorizing military action, it creates shared responsibility for war. A declaration of war informs the public of the burdens they will have to bear by leaving no doubt that Congress has decided on a new order — war — with how each member of Congress voted made known to the public.

Almost all Americans have heard Franklin Roosevelt’s speech to Congress on Dec. 8, 1941: “Yesterday, Dec. 7, 1941 — a date which will live in infamy — the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan … I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, Dec. 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.”

It was a moment of majesty and sobriety, and with Congress’ affirmation, represented the unquestioned will of the republic. There was no going back, and there was no question that the burden would be borne. True, the Japanese had attacked the United States, making getting the declaration easier. But that’s what the founders intended: Going to war should be difficult; once at war, the commander in chief’s authority should be unquestionable.

Forgoing the declaration
It is odd, therefore, that presidents who need that authorization badly should forgo pursuing it. Not doing so has led to seriously failed presidencies: Harry Truman in Korea, unable to seek another term; Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, also unable to seek a new term; George W. Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq, completing his terms but enormously unpopular. There was more to this than undeclared wars, but that the legitimacy of each war was questioned and became a contentious political issue certainly is rooted in the failure to follow constitutional pathways.

In understanding how war and constitutional norms became separated, we must begin with the first major undeclared war in American history (the Civil War was not a foreign war), Korea. When North Korea invaded South Korea, Truman took recourse to the new U.N. Security Council. He wanted international sanction for the war and was able to get it because the Soviet representatives happened to be boycotting the Security Council over other issues at the time.

Truman’s view was that U.N. sanction for the war superseded the requirement for a declaration of war in two ways. First, it was not a war in the strict sense, he argued, but a “police action” under the U.N. Charter. Second, the U.N. Charter constituted a treaty, therefore implicitly binding the United States to go to war if the United Nations so ordered. Whether Congress’ authorization to join the United Nations both obligated the United States to wage war at U.N. behest, obviating the need for declarations of war because Congress had already authorized police actions, is an interesting question. Whatever the answer, Truman set a precedent that wars could be waged without congressional declarations of war and that other actions — from treaties to resolutions to budgetary authorizations — mooted declarations of war.

If this was the founding precedent, the deepest argument for the irrelevancy of the declaration of war is to be found in nuclear weapons. Starting in the 1950s, paralleling the Korean War, was the increasing risk of nuclear war. It was understood that if nuclear war occurred, either through an attack by the Soviets or a first strike by the United States, time and secrecy made a prior declaration of war by Congress impossible. In the expected scenario of a Soviet first strike, there would be only minutes for the president to authorize counterstrikes and no time for constitutional niceties. In that sense, it was argued fairly persuasively that the Constitution had become irrelevant to the military realities facing the republic.

Nuclear war was seen as the most realistic war-fighting scenario, with all other forms of war trivial in comparison. Just as nuclear weapons came to be called “strategic weapons” with other weapons of war occupying a lesser space, nuclear war became identical with war in general. If that was so, then constitutional procedures that could not be applied to nuclear war were simply no longer relevant.

Paradoxically, if nuclear warfare represented the highest level of warfare, there developed at the lowest level covert operations. Apart from the nuclear confrontation with the Soviets, there was an intense covert war, from back alleys in Europe to the Congo, Indochina to Latin America. Indeed, it was waged everywhere precisely because the threat of nuclear war was so terrible: Covert warfare became a prudent alternative. All of these operations had to be deniable. An attempt to assassinate a Soviet agent or raise a secret army to face a Soviet secret army could not be validated with a declaration of war. The Cold War was a series of interconnected but discrete operations, fought with secret forces whose very principle was deniability. How could declarations of war be expected in operations so small in size that had to be kept secret from Congress anyway?

There was then the need to support allies, particularly in sending advisers to train their armies. These advisers were not there to engage in combat but to advise those who did. In many cases, this became an artificial distinction: The advisers accompanied their students on missions, and some died. But this was not war in any conventional sense of the term. And therefore, the declaration of war didn’t apply.

By the time Vietnam came up, the transition from military assistance to advisers to advisers in combat to U.S. forces at war was so subtle that there was no moment to which you could point that said that we were now in a state of war where previously we weren’t. Rather than ask for a declaration of war, Johnson used an incident in the Tonkin Gulf to get a congressional resolution that he interpreted as being the equivalent of war. The problem here was that it was not clear that had he asked for a formal declaration of war he would have gotten one. Johnson didn’t take that chance.

What Johnson did was use Cold War precedents, from the Korean War, to nuclear warfare, to covert operations to the subtle distinctions of contemporary warfare in order to wage a substantial and extended war based on the Tonkin Gulf resolution — which Congress clearly didn’t see as a declaration of war — instead of asking for a formal declaration. And this represented the breakpoint. In Vietnam, the issue was not some legal or practical justification for not asking for a declaration. Rather, it was a political consideration.

Johnson did not know that he could get a declaration; the public might not be prepared to go to war. For this reason, rather than ask for a declaration, he used all the prior precedents to simply go to war without a declaration. In my view, that was the moment the declaration of war as a constitutional imperative collapsed. And in my view, so did the Johnson presidency. In hindsight, he needed a declaration badly, and if he could not get it, Vietnam would have been lost, and so may have been his presidency. Since Vietnam was lost anyway from lack of public consensus, his decision was a mistake. But it set the stage for everything that came after — war by resolution rather than by formal constitutional process.

After the war, Congress created the War Powers Act in recognition that wars might commence before congressional approval could be given. However, rather than returning to the constitutional method of the Declaration of War, which can be given after the commencement of war if necessary (consider World War II) Congress chose to bypass declarations of war in favor of resolutions allowing wars. Their reason was the same as the president’s: It was politically safer to authorize a war already under way than to invoke declarations of war.

All of this arose within the assertion that the president’s powers as commander in chief authorized him to engage in warfare without a congressional declaration of war, an idea that came in full force in the context of nuclear war and then was extended to the broader idea that all wars were at the discretion of the president. From my simple reading, the Constitution is fairly clear on the subject: Congress is given the power to declare war. At that moment, the president as commander in chief is free to prosecute the war as he thinks best. But constitutional law and the language of the Constitution seem to have diverged. It is a complex field of study, obviously.

An increasing tempo of operations
All of this came just before the United States emerged as the world’s single global power — a global empire — that by definition would be waging war at an increased tempo, from Kuwait, to Haiti, to Kosovo, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, and so on in an ever-increasing number of operations. And now in Libya, we have reached the point that even resolutions are no longer needed.

It is said that there is no precedent for fighting al Qaeda, for example, because it is not a nation but a subnational group. Therefore, Bush could not reasonably have been expected to ask for a declaration of war. But there is precedent: Thomas Jefferson asked for and received a declaration of war against the Barbary pirates. This authorized Jefferson to wage war against a subnational group of pirates as if they were a nation.

Had Bush requested a declaration of war on al Qaeda on Sept. 12, 2001, I suspect it would have been granted overwhelmingly, and the public would have understood that the United States was now at war for as long as the president thought wise. The president would have been free to carry out operations as he saw fit. Roosevelt did not have to ask for special permission to invade Guadalcanal, send troops to India, or invade North Africa. In the course of fighting Japan, Germany and Italy, it was understood that he was free to wage war as he thought fit. In the same sense, a declaration of war on Sept. 12 would have freed him to fight al Qaeda wherever they were or to move to block them wherever the president saw fit.

Leaving aside the military wisdom of Afghanistan or Iraq, the legal and moral foundations would have been clear — so long as the president as commander in chief saw an action as needed to defeat al Qaeda, it could be taken. Similarly, as commander in chief, Roosevelt usurped constitutional rights for citizens in many ways, from censorship to internment camps for Japanese-Americans. Prisoners of war not adhering to the Geneva Conventions were shot by military tribunal — or without. In a state of war, different laws and expectations exist than during peace. Many of the arguments against Bush-era intrusions on privacy also could have been made against Roosevelt. But Roosevelt had a declaration of war and full authority as commander in chief during war. Bush did not. He worked in twilight between war and peace.

One of the dilemmas that could have been avoided was the massive confusion of whether the United States was engaged in hunting down a criminal conspiracy or waging war on a foreign enemy. If the former, then the goal is to punish the guilty. If the latter, then the goal is to destroy the enemy. Imagine that after Pearl Harbor, FDR had promised to hunt down every pilot who attacked Pearl Harbor and bring them to justice, rather than calling for a declaration of war against a hostile nation and all who bore arms on its behalf regardless of what they had done. The goal in war is to prevent the other side from acting, not to punish the actors.

The importance of the declaration
A declaration of war, I am arguing, is an essential aspect of war fighting particularly for the republic when engaged in frequent wars. It achieves a number of things.

First, it holds both Congress and the president equally responsible for the decision, and does so unambiguously. Second, it affirms to the people that their lives have now changed and that they will be bearing burdens. Third, it gives the president the political and moral authority he needs to wage war on their behalf and forces everyone to share in the moral responsibility of war. And finally, by submitting it to a political process, many wars might be avoided. When we look at some of our wars after World War II it is not clear they had to be fought in the national interest, nor is it clear that the presidents would not have been better remembered if they had been restrained. A declaration of war both frees and restrains the president, as it was meant to do.

I began by talking about the American empire. I won’t make the argument on that here, but simply assert it. What is most important is that the republic not be overwhelmed in the course of pursuing imperial goals. The declaration of war is precisely the point at which imperial interests can overwhelm republican prerogatives.

There are enormous complexities here. Nuclear war has not been abolished. The United States has treaty obligations to the United Nations and other countries. Covert operations are essential, as is military assistance, both of which can lead to war. I am not making the argument that constant accommodation to reality does not have to be made. I am making the argument that the suspension of Section 8 of Article I as if it is possible to amend the Constitution with a wink and nod represents a mortal threat to the republic. If this can be done, what can’t be done?

My readers will know that I am far from squeamish about war. I have questions about Libya, for example, but I am open to the idea that it is a low-cost, politically appropriate measure. But I am not open to the possibility that quickly after the commencement of hostilities the president need not receive authority to wage war from Congress. And I am arguing that neither the Congress nor the president have the authority to substitute resolutions for declarations of war. Nor should either want to. Politically, this has too often led to disaster for presidents. Morally, committing the lives of citizens to waging war requires meticulous attention to the law and proprieties.

As our international power and interests surge, it would seem reasonable that our commitment to republican principles would surge. These commitments appear inconvenient. They are meant to be. War is a serious matter, and presidents and particularly Congresses should be inconvenienced on the road to war. Members of Congress should not be able to hide behind ambiguous resolutions only to turn on the president during difficult times, claiming that they did not mean what they voted for. A vote on a declaration of war ends that. It also prevents a president from acting as king by default. Above all, it prevents the public from pretending to be victims when their leaders take them to war. The possibility of war will concentrate the mind of a distracted public like nothing else. It turns voting into a life-or-death matter, a tonic for our adolescent body politic.

What Happened to the American Declaration of War? is republished with permission of STRATFOR

US mercenary armies (aka “private contractors) of Blackwater’s Prince are now spreading through other countries. They will be the tools of opression by despotic rulers, willing to shoot people where the local army would not. These mercenaries could in the future establish or remove governments or even conduct terrorist attacks if the pay is good.

This is a good day for American people and a black day for unscrupulous buisnesses. Overall, business will improve as legal workers spend the earnings in the US instead of illegals sending them to their home countries.

“The Supreme Court on Thursday upheld an Arizona law that penalizes businesses for hiring workers in the country illegally, buoying the hopes of supporters of state crackdowns on illegal immigration.”

And who was against? Barak Obama, ACLU, democrats on the Supreme Court (Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor), and the Chamber of Commerce.

The measure makes it illegal for anyone conducting searches to touch “the anus, sexual organ, buttocks, or breast of another person” including through clothing. It also prohibits searches “that would be offensive to a reasonable person.” The catch is that it can (and likely will) be superseded by federal law.

C.S. Lewis was right when he wrote that “of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive.”

Time to start a new war, this one is becoming really boring…
Like in Sudan, where the South, supported by the US / West is sitting on oil. While the South has most of the oil, there is also some in the middle disputed area. Why leaving anything to the North?

The way to start a war is to attack one side’s soldiers who then pursue the other side’s fighters, kill a few civilians and give a casus belli for another humanitarian intervention. And here we are:
“The U.N. Security Council, which is visiting Sudan, released a statement Sunday blaming both sides for the violence. It said the south had attacked the convoy of northern soldiers and the north had escalated the confrontation by occupying Abyei.”

In the meantime, our allied revolutionary government of Tunisia continues torturing its opponents, just the different ones. “Acts of torture and abuse carried out in the last weeks of deposed president Ben Ali’s rule continue under the interim government, Agence France-Press reported, citing leading Tunisian rights activist Radhia Nasraoui on Saturday.”

OK, back to Libya.

NATO warplanes are bombing Libyan ships in their ports
in accordance with the UN “no fly” resolution. Very advanced ships, one must say when they can fly. The reason stated is that Libya is using them in their war against the rebels. Did not Lincoln also use government ships against the rebels?
Definitely not to prevent civilian supply ships to bring in food and other goods to Libya and aleviate the suffering that NATO brought to civilians in Libya. Bad civilians, of course, those that are not supporting looters.

“Another government official accused NATO of trying to frighten commercial ships from using ports under the control of the Libyan government. Mohammed Rashid, general manager of Tripoli’s port, said only eight commercial ships had entered the port since the NATO airstrikes began on March 19. The slowdown in shipping could reduce imports and drive up the cost of basic goods for Libyans, he said. This is a continuation of the humanitarian blockade that began before two months, he said.”

Rand Paul wants Senate to do something.
At least vote for the war if that is what the Senators want but no, that is not what they want. They want to make sure that they are not for the war and they are not against the war so it cannot be held against them and would not vote either way. So what are the Senators doing in Washington if all they are doing is abstain? Likely negotiating an increase in the national debt limit payable by you and me to finance their pork.